



Publications récentes



Giuseppe Attanasi, Claire Rimbaud et Marie-Claire Villeval, 2019, « Embezzlement and guilt aversion », *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, in press.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.02.002>.

Psychological game theory can contribute to renew the analysis of unethical behavior by providing insights on the nature of the moral costs of dishonesty. We investigate the moral costs of embezzlement in situations where donors need intermediaries to transfer their donations to recipients and where donations can be embezzled before they reach the recipients. We design a novel three-player Embezzlement Mini-Game to study whether intermediaries in the laboratory suffer from guilt aversion and whether guilt aversion affects the decision to embezzle.

Alan Novaes Tump, Charley M. Wu, **Imen Bouhlef** et Robert L. Goldstone, 2019, à paraître, « The evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in collective search », *Proceedings of the 41th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*. <https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/538447v1>.

How does cooperation arise in an evolutionary context? We approach this problem using a collective search paradigm where interactions are dynamic and there is competition for rewards. Using evolutionary simulations, we find that the unconditional sharing of information can be an evolutionary advantageous strategy without the need for conditional strategies or explicit reciprocation.

Agnès Festré, 2019, « Hayek on expectations: The interplay between two complex systems », *European Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, in press. doi: 10.1080/09672567.2019.1626464.



Nobuyuki Hanaki, Yukio Koriyama, Angela Sutan et Marc Willinger, 2019, « The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games », *Games and Economic Behavior*, vol. 113, pp. 587-610, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.006>.

Recent experimental studies have shown that observed outcomes deviate significantly more from the Nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than when they are strategic substitutes. This “strategic environment effect” offers promising insights into the aggregate consequences of interactions among heterogeneous boundedly rational agents, but its macroeconomic implications have been questioned because the underlying experiments involve a small number of agents. We studied beauty contest games with a unique interior Nash equilibrium to determine the critical group size for triggering the strategic environment effect, and we use both theory and experiments to shed light on its effectiveness.

Contrat

« **Smart Contracts for IoT** » coordonné par François Verdier et **Lise Arena** (pour la partie SHS) – projet InterAcadémique (Ac. 1 DS4H et Ac. 5 Hommes, Idée et Milieux). Période : 2018-2020 (2 ans). Montant global du financement : 208 420€.

Les membres suivants du laboratoire participent à ce contrat : Amel Attour, Agnès Festré, Michela Chessa, Eva Mouial, Marina Teller, Caroline Lequesne-Roth

Workshops

CoDIReM est à l’initiative de plusieurs workshops :

« CoCoLab Workshop », « Interdisciplinary perspective on behavioural public policy », « LEENobi Workshop » et pris part au Colloque « Tribual des Océans ».

Voir la présentation dans la partie « colloques » de cette Lettre.

