Séminaire KTO-GREDEG-OFCE - Marie LACLAU (HEC Paris)

Communication games on networks
Quand ? Le 12-09-2019,
de 14:00 à 15:30
Où ? Room Picasso - GREDEG
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Marie LACLAU (HEC Paris)

More about Marie Laclau

Séminaire joint KTO-GREDEG-OFCE

Title: Communication games on networks

Co-authors: L. Renou and X. Venel

Abstract: We consider a setting in which a privately informed sender would like to transmit information strategically to a decision-maker, but communication has to go through a network of intermediaries. Only the sender is informed, and the utilities of all agents depend both on the state of the world and the action taken by the decision maker. For instance, some intermediaries might be adversarial and might want to prevent the transmission of the sender’s message, or modify it, in order for the decision maker to take their preferred action. Communication is dynamic, and at each stage, agent simultaneously send messages to their neighbors in a network. When the decision-maker decides to take an action, the communication game stops. The objective is to characterize the networks of communication for which all the equilibrium outcomes of the direct communication game between the sender and the decision-maker, without intermediaries, can be obtained as perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) outcomes of the network games with intermediaries. The main result shows that it is possible if and only if the network is 2-connected. A stronger condition on the network geometry makes it possible to obtain the communication equilibrium outcomes of the direct game as PBE outcomes of the network game with intermediaries. Communication protocols are constructed in order to show these results.