Overdetermined causation cases, contribution and the Shapley value

Samuel Ferey* and Pierre Dehez**

* BETA (University of Lorraine, Nancy, France)
samuel.ferey@univ-lorraine.fr

** CORE (University of Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)
pierre.dehez@uclouvain.be

ABSTRACT

The overdetermined causation cases (duplicative causation, concurrent causes *etc*.) challenge the consistency and relevance of the but-for-test in Torts. A strict application of the but-for criterion to these cases leads to paradoxes and solutions that violate common sense. This explains why a large literature has been developed in philosophy and jurisprudence to provide more accurate causation criteria. The paper adds to this literature by considering over-determination cases from an economic and mathematical point of view. Following Van Hees and Braham (2009), we consider over-determined cases through cooperative game theory and define "overdetermined causation games". We characterize these games in terms of marginal contribution to the great coalition and we provide a typology of different overdetermined causation cases. Lastly, we apply to these games a traditional sharing rule developed in cooperative game theory, the Shapley-value, to assessing the "causal" contribution of each tortfeasor.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful for helpful comments from the Editor and referees. Authors acknowledge the financial support from the French National Agency for Research (JCJC Damage program, ANR-12-JSH1-0001, 2012-2016).

Outline

1. INTRODUCTION
2. OVERDETERMINATED CAUSATION CASES: EXAMPLES AND PARADOXES
3. OVERDETERMINED CAUSATION GAMES
4. CONTRIBUTIONS, CAUSATION AND THE SHAPLEY VALUE
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

1. INTRODUCTION

Causation is one of the most intricate and complex issues in the law. As Wright stated "in all of tort law, there is no concept which has been as pervasive and yet elusive as the causation requirement".[1] Among the issues raised by causation requirement, over-determination is, at least conceptually, particularly difficult to deal with. The reason is that applying standard criteria of causation – based on necessity requirements (but-for-test, *sine qua non* conditions) – to overdetermined-causation cases fail to give coherent and comprehensive answers to courts. The most famous example is the following. Two fires, lighted separately by two tortfeasors *X* and *Y*, merge together. The merged fire then destroys the plaintiff's house. "Here, application of the "but-for" test would exonerate both X and Y if each fire were large enough to burn the house by itself. Even in the absence of X's fire, the house would have been burned by Y's fire" [2]. So, *X*'s fire is not a but for cause. And the same thing could be said about *Y*'s fire. *Y*'s fire is not causal. The application of the but-for test in these circumstances leads to dilemmas and paradoxes: holding that none of the two wrongdoers be liable violates the common sense and the principles of distributive and corrective justice.[3]

This failure explains why legal thought and jurisprudence have tried to elaborate further on causation requirements. For example, in the US, the *Restatement of Tort (Third) on Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm* dedicates its chapter 5 to this issue.[4] The *Restatement (Third)* advocates new methods to deal with overdetermined causation cases and interesting concepts are used: multiple sufficient causes, multiple sufficient causal sets, preemption, and trivial contribution[5]. In Europe, *Principles of*

---

[1] Prosser states: "There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion. Nor, despite the manifold attempts which have been made to clarify the subject, is there yet any general agreement as to the proper approach" (quoted *in* William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, *Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach*, 12 J. LEGAL STUDIES 109, 109 (1983). *See* Richard Wright, *Causation in Tort Law*, 73 CALIFORNIA L. REV. 1735 (1985); Herbert L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré, *Causation in the Law*, (2d ed., Clarendon Press) (1985) ; John L. Mackie, *The Cement of the Universe: A Study on Causation* (Clarendon Press) (1974); Jane Stapleton, *Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences*, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 968 (2001) (upholding the "dignity of the law" requires modifying the but-for standard). Tony A. M. Honoré, *Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Tort Law*, *in* D. G. Owen (ed.), *Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law*, , 363–385 (Clarendon Press) (1995); Richard Wright, *Once More into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution and the extent of Legal Responsibility*, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1071 (2001). *See also* Richard Goldberg (ed.), *Perspectives on causation*, (Hart) (2013); Michael Moore, *Causation and Responsibility* (Oxford) (2009).

[2] David A. Fisher, *Insufficient Causes*, 94 KENTUCKY. L. JOURNAL, 277 (2005-2006).

[3] *See* Jules L. Coleman, *Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice*, 67 INDIANA L. J 349 (1992).

[4] See the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, Chapter 5, Factual cause, and especially §27 Multiple Sufficient Causes. See also Chapter 6. Scope of Liability (Proximate Cause, § 36 Trivial Contributions to Multiple Sufficient Causes, thereinafter Restatement (Third).

[5] See the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM, CHAPTER 5, FACTUAL CAUSE, and especially §27 MULTIPLE SUFFICIENT CAUSES. *See also* Chapter 6. SCOPE OF LIABILITY (PROXIMATE CAUSE, § 36 TRIVIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO MULTIPLE SUFFICIENT CAUSES, thereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD).

5. Courts and scholars have long recognized the problem of overdetermined harm—harm produced by multiple sufficient causes—and the inadequacy of the but-for standard for these situations; *see* Charles E.

European Tort Law (PETL) deal with this issue in articles 3 and 9.[6] From a larger perspective, legal scholars in the US and elsewhere have also written a lot on this topic in order to reach better and more convincing solutions. For example, following Hart, Honoré and Mackie, Richard Wright has elaborated the NESS criterion to solve some of these paradoxes.[7] Others, like Jane Stapelton, think that the law has to go further and should keep necessity requirement to characterizing a cause for simple cases and recognizing the relevance of partial causation based on contribution i.e. a factor may have had a causal role due to a positive, even unnecessary, contribution "to the relevant mechanism by which the phenomenon came about".[8] Others scholars doubt that human mind could ever capture all the difficulties encapsulated in causation requirements.[9] The aim of the paper is to add to this literature on overdetermined causation cases and show that economic models could be very useful to legal scholars.

Causation issue has a long and complicated story in law and economics. Indeed, the seminal paper published by Coase in 1960 relied on the idea than harm was symmetric and therefore that causation was misleading.[10] The idea of Coase was that *if*

Carpenter, *Concurrent Causation*, 83 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA L. R 941 (1935); Robert J. Peaslee, *Multiple Causation and Damage*, HARVARD L. R. 47, 1127 (1934).

[6] *See Principles of European Tort Law* ("In case of multiple activities, where each of them alone would have caused the damage at the same time, each activity is regarded as a cause of the victim's damage" (Art. 3:102. Concurrent causes) and "In the case of multiple activities, when it is certain that none of them has caused the entire damage or any determinable part thereof, those that are likely to have [minimally] contributed to the damage are presumed to have caused equal shares thereof. (Art. 3:105. Uncertain partial causation). See TITLE V. MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS.

[7] The NESS test considers that a factual cause is a "necessary element of a sufficient set". *See* Wright, 1985, *op cit*. p. 1788; Chris Miller, *NESS for Beginners*, *in* Richard Goldberg (ed.), *op. cit*., 323-338.

[8] *See* Stapelton, *op. cit*., "This article argues that a preferable approach for private law is a clear recognition of a general principle that all that is required before the relation between a factor and the existence of a phenomenon will be recognised as "causal" is that: either, but for the factor, the phenomenon would have been prevented; or the factor resulted in some positive contribution to the relevant mechanism by which the phenomenon came about. In other words, that, when determining what it means to be a "cause", private law should adopt a notion of a "cause" that is wider than the relation of necessity that is encapsulated in the but-for test." (p. 39). See *Principles of European Tort Law*, the article 3:105 uses the term of "partial causation" and adds "those that are likely to have [minimally] contributed to the damage". *See also* the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) which refers to "substantial factor" in § 432(2).

[9] *See* Fisher, *op cit*., "While I applaud the use of devices such as the but-for test and the NESS test to clarify our thinking about cause, I cannot believe we will ever be able to develop a mechanical test that will satisfactorily resolve difficult issues such as those discussed in this article" (p. 317). See Peasley, *art. cit*. "Logic has not always the last word in law" (p. 1131). For similar ideas in France, *see* Boris Starck, *La pluralité des causes de dommages et responsabilité civile*, 6 JCP, I2339, (1970): "Dans ce domaine, il n'existe aucun critère concevable pour apprécier l'influence causale de divers facteurs ayant contribué à provoquer le dommage" (On this issue there is no conceivable criteria to evaluate the causal influence of several factors that brought about harm") (p. 13).

[10] For Cooter "how is legal cause imbedded in formal models? Do the formal models clarify difficult legal issues about causation, as concluded by such writers as Calabresi, Shavell, and Landes and Posner? Is the disappearance of "cause" from the formal models evidence of scientific progress and a reason for celebration, as Russell's views suggest? Or do the formal models obscure legal cause and suppress interesting legal issues, as asserted by critics such as Wright?" Robert D. Cooter, *Torts as the Union of Liberty and Efficiency: an Essay on Causation*, 63 CHICAGO KENT L. R. 522 (1987), p. 523. For Posner and Landes, "Much of the scholarly literature on the subject, including that part of the literature which takes an explicitly philosophical approach to questions of causation, 2 is devoted to trying to define "cause" and

tort laws aim at maximizing the social welfare - assuming evaluation of social welfare be possible – causation issues are irrelevant. The only thing to do is to compare the different activities (injuring and injured activities) from the point of view of efficiency. And the main social role played by tort law is to allocate the respective rights. Many of law and economics models, including those about multiple tortfeasors, agree with Coase and focus on efficiency, incentives, deterrence and maximization of welfare.[11]

Our approach is different from these models based on incentives and deterrence[12]. We use another branch of economic theory, named cooperative game theory, which deals with the properties of the rules to share a benefit or a cost resulting from a common activity between individuals. This approach seems particularly appropriate to deal with causation issues in the law insofar as the cornerstones of this approach are the concept of *sets* of player; contribution to a coalition and sharing rules.[13] Such an approach has already been developed in philosophy by Van Hees and Braham to characterizing "degrees of causation" notably in voting contexts. We follow these authors but we provide a more operational view for the law.[14] We will see that applying cooperative game theory concepts leads to highlight some of the paradoxes raising from overdetermined causation cases. The language of game theory – coalition, sets, minimally sufficiency sets, contribution – is relevant for the law. The finding of the paper is also to provide a unified approach on overdetermined causation cases: firstly, most of the overdetermined causation cases are covered under a same model, secondly, the deep relationships between different criteria of causation are made clearer by the

---

then to fit the cases to the definition. The principal result of these efforts has been a negative one: to show that the notions of causation used in tort cases cannot be reduced to a single concept, whether necessary conditions, or sufficient conditions, or necessary and sufficient conditions" William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, *op. cit*., p. 109.

[11] One of the rare paper dealing with Coase, causation and cooperative game theory is Aivazian, Varouj and Jeffrey L. Callen, *The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core,* 24 J. OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 175 (1981).

[12] In economics, a constant attention has been devoted to this topic. *See* John Borgo, *Causal Paradigms in Tort Law*, 8 J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 419 (1979); William Landes, and Richard A. Posne, *art. cit*.; Mario J. Rizzo and Franck S. Arnold, *Causal apportionment: reply to the critics*, 15 J.*of Legal Studies* 219 (1986); Lewis Kornhauser and Richard L. Revesz, *Sharing Damages among Multiple Tortfeasors*, 98 *Yale L. J.* 831 (1989); Francesco Parisi and Ram Singh, *The Efficiency of Comparative Causation*, 6 REV OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 219 (2010); Robert Young, Michael Faure, Paul Fenn and Jonathan Willis, *Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis*, 3 REV OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 111 (2007).

[13] On the voting analogy, *see* Stapelton, *art. cit*.: "A company produced a leather-spray to be used by consumers on their leather clothing. The company discovered that the spray was extremely toxic for certain elderly people and others with respiratory conditions. The relevant group of executives voted unanimously to market the product (the voting rule required only a majority of votes.) Subsequently the product killed a number of consumers. Consider the vote of one of the executives. In relation to the consumer deaths their vote to market the product had not been necessary. If the law reserved the term "a cause" for only factors that were but-for factors, each individual executive would escape any personal criminal or civil liability that required him to have been a "cause" of the consumer deaths, because none was a but-for factor" (pp. 43-44) and compare with Martin Van Hees and Matthew Braham, *art. cit*. using power index in game theory to give an evaluation of the causal power of a single voter (p. 334).

[14] We have already shown that such an approach could be fruitful to handle with multiple causation. *See* Pierre Dehez and Samuel Ferey, *How to Share Joint Liability. A Cooperative Game Approach*, 66 MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES 44 (2013); *Multiple Causation, Apportionment and the Shapley Value*, 45 J. OF LEGAL STUDIES, *forthcoming*.

language of game theory[15] and thirdly, causation criteria and sharing rules to know how to divide the damage among tortfeasors involved are analyzed in a unique framework.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give some examples of overdetermined causation cases to provide a typology of the different situations covered. In section 3, we define the "overdetermined causation games". The concepts of players (individuals), coalitions of players, and characteristic function are introduced in the circumstances of multiple causation. We then study the general properties of these games. In section 4, we develop the concept of contribution of a player to a coalition, including the grand coalition which joins all the tortfeasors. We show that saying "a player has not been a necessary cause" – that is to say that the harm would have occurred even if he had not acted tortiously – is not equivalent to saying that "his contribution is zero"[16]. In other words, there is a room open to consider both that (i) a tortfeasor has positively contributed to the damage and (ii) he has not been a necessary condition. We insist on the Shapley value as a relevant evaluation of the contribution of a player to the game. According to us, the Shapley value is consistent with the NESS criteria. However, as we insist on an evaluation of the individual contribution to the final damage, those interested in partial causation based on contribution may be convinced. Last, this evaluation could be a benchmark to apportion damage between torfeasors in the case of several and joint liability when one torfeasor has completely paid the victim and has a claim against the other tortfeasors to get their shares back. Section 5 concludes.

2. OVERDETERMINATED CAUSATION CASES: EXAMPLES AND PARADOXES

Overdetermination is a general category under which several kinds of cases may be subsumed. In the legal literature and sources, others terms referring to more or less the same issue are used: "multiple sufficient causes", "preemption" or "preemptive causes", "additional causes"[17], "competing causes"[18], "concurrent cause"[19], "duplicative-

---

[15] *See* Robert J. Aumann, *What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish*, *in* Kenneth Arrow and S. Honkaphja, FRONTIERS OF ECONOMICS, (Basil Blackwell) 28 (1985), 38 ("This brings us to the second component of comprehension, which is really part of the first: unification. The broader the area that is covered by a theory, the greater is its 'validity'. I am not thinking of ''validity' in the usual sense of truth, but rather in the sense of applicability or usefulness").

[16] This is all the more interesting because our approach builds a bridge between but for test, NESS and contribution. *See* the criticism from the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) against the RESTATAMENT (SECOND) about "substantial factor" which assumes an evaluation of the causal strength of the tortious act.

[17] Hart and Honoré, 1985, *op. cit*., 235 ("we deal with additional causes, i.e. with cases in which there are present on a given occasion two or more factors each sufficient with other normal conditions to bring about certain harm",). See The RESTATEMENT (THIRD), REPORTER'S NOTE, COMMENT B. HISTORY AND TERMINOLOGY.

[18] RESTATEMENT (THIRD), § 27 MULTIPLE SUFFICIENT CAUSES, COMMENT A. MULTIPLE SUFFICIENT CAUSES GENERALLY: "This Section applies whenever there are two or more competing causes, each of which is sufficient without the other to cause the harm and each of which is in operation at the time the plaintiff's harm occurs."

[19] *See Principles of European Tort Law*, article 3:102. *See* also n. 6 and 8.

causation"[20], "insufficient causes"[21], "unnecessary causes", "threshold cases"[22], "cumulative sources of harm"[23]. These categories may refer to different hypothesis, scenarios and cases[24]. But, they share a common property which is that one or several tortfeasors will not be considered as a cause under the but-for-test because their tortious act is not necessary (i.e. even if they had acted non-tortiously, the harm would have still occurred). This section gives some examples and cases and explores the paradoxes raised. In all the following, we use the traditional legal definition for the but-for-test.

2.1 *Multiple sufficient and unnecessary causes (Rosaria and Vincenzo fires)*

The first example is the simplest. It deals with multiple sufficient causes and is well illustrated by the two-fire case. In that case, two fires negligently and independently lighted by two people merge and destroy the property of the victim[25]. None of the two tortious act is a necessary condition for the harm in the sense that if one of the tortfeasor had not lighted his fire, the harm would have still happened. The strict application of the but-for-test would lead to exonerate both of them. And the result reached is uncomfortable. Here is an example of duplicative causation and is the first category of overdetermined causation cases. A point should be noticed: it is clear that none of the two fires was necessary but at the same time both of them were sufficient.

2.2 *Multiple sufficient causal sets : unnecessary and non sufficient conditions (Paul's car)*

The second case, "Paul's car" following the illustration provided by the *Restatement*[26], changes the previous example by assuming that tortious activities are neither necessary nor sufficient: "A, B and C, acting independently but simultaneously,

---

[20] Wright, 1985, *art. cit*., p. 1791.

[21] Fisher, *art. cit*., p. 277.

[22] Stapelton, 2013, *art. cit*., p. 39.

[23] Miller *art. cit.,* p. 327.

[24] *See* for example the discussion of the Hart and Honoré typology *in* Wright, *art. cit*., 1985, pp.1791-1801. ("Perhaps as a result of their confusing typology, Hart and Honoré lose sight of the basic concept of causation embodied in the NESS test" p. 1797).

[25] *See* note 2. *See* the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ILLUSTRATION 1: "Rosaria and Vincenzo were independently camping in a heavily forested campground. Each one had a campfire, and each negligently failed to ensure that the fire was extinguished upon retiring for the night. Due to unusually dry forest conditions and a stiff wind, both campfires escaped their sites and began a forest fire. The two fires, burning out of control, joined together and engulfed Centurion Company's hunting lodge, destroying it. Either fire alone would have destroyed the lodge. Each of Rosaria's and Vincenzo's negligence is a factual cause of the destruction of Centurion's hunting lodge".

[26] *See* Charles E. Carpenter, *op. cit*. Stapelton illustrates this by the bridge example *in* Stapleton, *art. cit*., 43 ("no individual was necessary for the destruction of the car, yet, it seems plausible that the law would want to identify their role. If the law required a factor to satisfy the but for test before it would be recognized as a factual 'cause' the striking result would be that, [...], the law would not identify any of these three individuals as a 'cause' of the car's destruction").

each negligently lean on Paul's car, which is parked at the lookout at the top of a mountain. Their combined force results in the car rolling over a diminutive curbstone and plummeting down the mountain to its destruction. The force exerted by the push of any of one actor would have been insufficient to propel Paul's car past the cuberstone, but the combined force of any of two of them is sufficient".[27] Here too, the but-for-test seems to be inappropriate and leads to exonerate the three tortfeasors because none of them is necessary. But, dealing with those cases is different from the two fires example: contrary to the two fires example, none of the tortious acts is sufficient. There are only sets of tortious conducts which are sufficient to actually cause the harm. The *Restatement* clearly recognizes this feature and refers to "multiple sufficient causal sets". These cases have motivated legal scholars to find another criteria of causation. The NESS test advocates that *A* is a factual cause of the harm because it is possible to find a set of torfeasors including *A* which is sufficient to cause the harm and where *A* is a necessary element of this set: the set {*A*,*B*} is sufficient to destroy the car and kill the passenger and, at the same time, removing *A* from the set {*A*,*B*} leads to no harm. *A* is a necessary element of a sufficient set.[28]

2.3 *Unnecessary causes: one is sufficient, the others are not (bridge)*

The two previous cases do not cover all the overdetermined causation cases. More subtle and complex cases, which are not properly handled by the dichotomy "unnecessary and sufficiency"/"unnecessary and no sufficiency", are easy to imagine. It could be thought that certain kind of litigations before the courts, like the cases named "threshold cases" by Stapelton for example, are cases of this type. Let us change the train examples provided by Stapleton and explained in footnote 27.

Assume the bridge carrying the line was built to withstand a weight below 16 units. The train weight 10 units and the three tortfeasors place different weights on the bridge (*A*: 6 units; *B*: 3 units and *C*: 3 units). The train passes across the bridge, the bridge collapses and a passenger is killed. But, now, *A* is unnecessary but sufficient, while *B* and *C* are unnecessary and not sufficient. The but-for-test would reach a solution where no tortfeasor would be liable. At the same time, the NESS test would say that the three tortious conducts are factual causes of harm (there exist at least one set where *A*, *B* and

---

[27] THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM, §27, ILLUSTRATION 3. Stapelton, *op. cit*., 47-48 ("On a certain train line the trains weigh 10 units each; a bridge carrying the line was built to withstand a weight of 20 units. A train will pass across the bridge at noon. Before noon X deposits a weight of 6 units within the bridge structure, then Y deposits another 6-unit weight, then Z deposits another 6-unit weight. X, Y and Z act independently and are unaware of the conduct of each other. At noon the train attempts to cross the bridge which collapses, killing a passenger on the train").

[28] *See* footnote 7. Miller states an important point about the NESS test "Central to Wright's approach (and contrary to that of many legal scholars in this area) is the assertion that it is possible to construct a causal account of a set of events (leading to a harmful outcome) which is independent of those considerations by which an agent of these events might be deemed legally liable." (Chris Miller, *art. cit*., p. 323).

C are necessary for the sufficiency of the set).[29]

But the NESS test gives little information about the respective degrees of causation and the causal contributions of each of the tortious conducts. Agent A could be said to have had a more important causal power or contribution than *B* or *C*.[30] Activity *A* is sufficient while the other ones are not, is it meaningfull to consider that A has had a more important causal power than *B* or *C* ? It seems to us that Hart and Honoré address this issue when they refer to "degrees of causation".[31] In other words, this example raises the issue of whether apportionment among tortfeasors should be done on the basis of their causal contributions to the harm and how to proceed. Our model will deal with this issue in section 3.

2.4 *Non sufficient causes: one is necessary and the other is not (pollution)*

The typology in terms of necessary and sufficiency causes leads to other possible cases mixing a necessary cause with an unnecessary one, both being non-sufficient. An example is the case in which different firms have caused damage by simultaneously pouring amounts of toxic substance into a lake. and in which no single firm could cause the damage alone. Imagine that the victim raises salmon in a pond on his property.[32] Three firms, identified as 1, 2 and 3, negligently poisons this pond by pouring dangerous chemicals. Assume a threshold exists, say 75 units, above which the concentration of chemicals becomes lethal for salmon. Assume that firm 1 has poured 50 units while firms 2 and 3 have poured 30 units each.[33] Firm 1 tortious act is necessary but not sufficient while firm 2 (resp. 3) tortious act not unnecessary nor sufficient. The result

---

[29] THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD), COMMENT F ("Moreover, the fact that the other person's conduct is sufficient to cause the harm does not prevent the actor's conduct from being a factual cause of harm pursuant to this Section, if the actor's conduct is necessary to at least one causal set. Sometimes, one actor's contribution may be sufficient to bring about the harm while another actor's contribution is only sufficient when combined with some portion of the first actor's contribution. Whether the second actor's contribution can be so combined into a sufficient causal set is a matter on which this Restatement takes no position and leaves to future development in the courts").

[30] This point is recognized in the RESTATEMENT.

[31] *See* Hart and Honoré, *op. cit*., p. 233: "Can a meaning be attached to 'degrees of causation'? There are some indications in ordinary speech that it can. An event is often, outside the law, said to be caused partly by one factor and partly by another, or more by one thing than another, or mostly by a particular factor. [...] If then, 'degrees of responsibility' are to be interpreted in causal terms the most rational basis for apportionment becomes the relatively dangerous character of the acts of the various tortfeasors." For a similar view, see Martin Van Hees and Matthew Braham op. cit. p. 325: "The meaning attached to "substantial factor" is close. Given the practical demand, can any factual content be given to the notion of degrees of causation? One prominent answer, which is the one that Hart and Honoré (1959, p.233ff) provided in their seminal monograph Causation in the Law is to say that the concept, while valid, is inescapably vague with its substance being provided by attributive terms of ordinary language. That is, 'degrees of causation' is captured by locutions such as the 'chief' or 'main' or 'principal' cause, or of 'more important', 'effective' or 'potent' causes."

[32] *See* the discussion in Richard Wright, *art. cit*., 1985.

[33] The same structure would be obtained by changing the Paul car's example and assuming that one of the three tortfeasors be stronger than the others but not strong enough to push the car by himself. If he needs the help of only one of the two others, this tortfeasor is a wrongdoer who belongs to all the sufficient sets that bring about the harm.

which the courts would reach by applying the but-for-test would be to declare firm 1 liable and to exonerate firms 2 and 3, despite the fact that firm 1 alone would not have exceeded the threshold.[34] The illustration 4 in the Restatement belongs to this category when it states "*that there are common elements in each of the sufficient causal sets does not prevent each of the sets from being a factual cause pursuant to this Section*". At the same times, compared to the previous example, common sense would say that firm 1 is "more causally" involved than the other two firms.

2.5 *Non sufficient necessary causes and sufficient unnecessary cause (push/pull car)*

The last type of example is less likely to happen and implies what is called neutralizing causes by Hart and Honoré[35]. Such cases shall not exist with two players because it is impossible and contradictory for *A* to be necessary and non-sufficient and for *B* to be unnecessary and sufficient at the same time. However, with three tortfeasors (*A*, *B* and *C*), such a structure may appear. It would be the case in Paul's car example if *A* is not strong enough to move the car by himself while *B* and *C* are strong enough. Imagine that *A* and *B* have pushed the car while *C* have pulled it. In that situation, *B* alone (resp. *C*) would have destroyed the car *B* (resp. *C*) is sufficient but not necessary) but *B* and *C* taken together, because one pulls the car while the other pushes it, do not bring about any harm. *B* and *C* are neutralizing causes in the sense of Hart and Honoré. It is because *A* participates to the common activity and adds a small and marginal push that the car actually falls in the ravine, A is not sufficient but necessary.[36]

To conclude, Table 1 summarizes different situations implying necessary and unnecessary causes, sufficient causes and non-sufficient causes. We restraint our table to two potential causes (*A* and *B*) for more simplicity. Several remarks should be made. First, the table is symmetric and all the combinations are not possible (for example two different causes cannot be said "necessary and sufficient"). Second, some combinations are impossible with two players but become possible with three. This is illustrated by the push/pull case. Third, the case implying two necessary and no sufficient causes is excluded. It is not an overdetermined causation case. In this way, the table covers all types of overdetermined causation cases.

---

[34] *See* the RESTATEMENT (THIRD), COMMENT G on toxic disease ("When a person contracts a disease such as cancer, and sues multiple actors claiming that each provided some dose of a toxic substance that caused the disease, the question of the causal role of each defendant's toxic substance arises. Assuming that there is some threshold dose sufficient to cause the disease, the person may have been exposed to doses in excess of the threshold before contracting the disease. Thus, some or all of the person's exposures may not have been but-for causes of the disease. Nevertheless, each of the exposures prior to the person's contracting the disease (or the time at which the disease was determined, see § 26, Comment *k*) is a factual cause of the person's disease under the rule in this Section").

[35] *See* Hart and Honoré, *op. cit.*, p.239 and sq. gives the following example "A negligently sets a fire which would have been sufficient to destroy C's house but, before the fire reaches C's house, it is quenched by the waters which B has negligently allowed to escape from a dam."

[36] Under these assumptions, *C* (resp. *B*) is a sufficient and unnecessary cause. The same structure would take place in some case of preemptive causation where the consequences of an act are neutralized by the consequences of another act. See the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) COMMENT I on preemption.

			A			
			Necessary		**Not Necessary**	
			Sufficient	**Not Sufficient**	**Sufficient**	**Not Sufficient**
B	**Necessary**	**Sufficient**	Impossible	Impossible	Impossible	Trivial
		Not Sufficient	Impossible	Excluded	Push/pull car	Pollution
	Not Necessary	**Sufficient**	Impossible	Push/pull car	Two fires	Bridge
		Not Sufficient	Trivial	Pollution	Bridge	Paul's car

Table 1. Overdetermined causation case: a typology

3. Overdetermined causation games

This section elaborates on cooperative game theory developed in economics to handle with over-determination issues in the law. Intuitively, we argue that people have acted together to bring about the harmful consequences. We do not mean that they jointly acted on purpose but only that their join acts have had a consequence, the harm suffered by the victim denoted *d* (*d* is the monetized damage to be paid by liable parties to the victim). The first step of the model is to formally "describe" the data of the case. The second step is to characterize the individual contribution of each player to the common result *d*; the third step is to analyze how to share the liability among the players.

We provide a model in order to capture the essential features of overdetermined causation cases. Firstly, "liability games" are formally defined. The concepts of grand coalition and sub-coalitions in relation to the law are presented and discussed; secondly, we deal with marginal contribution concept in order to characterizing necessity, sufficiency and but-for-test in terms of *individual contribution* to a coalition. The main finding of this section is to demonstrate that cooperative game theory is relevant to better understand causation issues in law and allows to better characterizing what the law refers to by "sufficient", "sufficient sets", "multiple sufficient causes" or "but-for-test".

3.1 *Definitions of overdetermined causation games: coalition and causation*

We consider the courts have to settle a case involving multiple tortfeasors. Contrary to many law and economics models considering causation from an *ex ante* perspective, we consider causation issues from an *ex post* perspective, once the harm has occurred. We assume that courts are able to monetize the harm suffered by the victim. The set of the tortfeasors involved in the case is denoted by N ($n \geq 2$). Tortfeasors are called the players of the game: the three people negligently pushing the Paul's car are the set of players in the example 1, the three polluters negligently

polluting the stream are the set of players in the example 4 *etc*. We do not assume that they should be held to be a factual cause but only that they are involved in the case.

To formalize this idea, let's assume that n injurers have been involved, $n \geq 2$. Each injurer is identified by an index i running from 1 to n. We consider all possible subsets of the set $N = \{1,...n\}$ of all injurers and we denote by $v(S)$ the potential damage of subset S.[37] The potential damages $v(S)$ are all hypothetical, except $v(N)$ that is nothing but the actual damage suffered by the victim that must be divided between the injurers.

In this way, we construct a "*characteristic function*" v that associates a number to each subset of N. Formally, the couple (N,v) is a *cooperative game with transferable utility*.[38] Here, injurers are "players", subsets of injurers are "coalitions" and potential damages are coalitions' worth. The toolbox of the theory of cooperative games can then be used. Here, we shall use the *Shapley value*, a well-known allocation rule introduced by Shapley in 1953, based on the notion of *marginal contribution*.[39]

In a general context, $v(S)$ is the "worth" of coalition S which measures the minimum that coalition S can ensure by itself, if it forms. In our context, $v(N)$ has to be considered as an actual and observable event – the actual result from the tortious acts of all the players involved. On the contrary, $v(S)$ with S a proper subset of N, should be interpreted as a counterfactuals, i.e. the harm that would have occurred if the players outside S had not acted tortiously.[40] In the Paul's car example, $v(AB)$ is the harm brought about by A and B pushing the car, assuming that C did not push the car;[41] $v(A)$ is the harm brought about by the behavior of A (A's push) in the hypothetical circumstances where B and C have not pushed the car.[42] In our example, A is supposed to be not strong enough to move the car by himself, consequently, in that hypothetical situation, the harm would not have occurred and $v(A) = 0$.[43]

---

[37] The empty set $\varnothing$ is a subset and, by convention, $v(\varnothing) = 0$. The empty set refers to the "normal course of events" assuming that no tortious act occurs by any players. The harm in that hypothetical state of the world is normalized to zero.

[38] Transferable utility games have been is a concept introduced by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR *(*Princeton) 1944 (3rd and last edition dated 1953).

[39] Contrary to Martin Van Hees and Matthew Braham (*art. cit.*) who insist on power index, we argue that the Shapley value needs to be considered to assess the causal contribution.

[40] Fisher criticizes NESS test by using a splitting argument (Fisher, *art. cit.*).

[41] The worth of a coalition $\{A,B\}$ should be noted $v(\{A,B\})$. For simplicity, we write $v(\{A,B\}) = v(AB)$.

[42] For simplicity, our approach is dichotomic: we deal with two types of actions ("push" or "not push") but it would be possible to introduce more subtle actions as "a weak push", a "strong push" *etc*. Similarly, only two states of the world are considered here (damage occurs or not). What matters is the possibility to associate a value to every coalition.

[43] The important point is that the characteristic function does not make specific hypothesis on causation between players and harm. Indeed, we could add a fourth player, D, saying named Smith, who, at the same time that Paul's car was pushed in the ravine, drove too fast on a highway far away. D acted tortiously and could be added as a player of Paul's car game but he will be a nul player: He never changes the value of any coalition regarding the car destruction.

With two tortfeasors, there are 3 coalitions: {1},{2},{1,2}. With three tortfeasors, there are 7 coalitions : {1},{2},{3},{1,2},{1,3},{2,3}, {1,2,3}.[44] The function *v* associates to each coalition the harm it brings about. In the following, we illustrate the formal concept with cases presented in section 2. See for example the "pollution game". The set of tortfeasors is $N = \{1,2,3\}$ and the associated characteristic function *v* is given by:

$$v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = 0$$
$$v(12) = v(13) = d$$
$$v(23) = 0$$
$$v(123) = d$$

Firm 1 has a veto: without firm 1, damage would not occur.

3.2 *Marginal contributions and causation criteria*

The originality of cooperative game theory lies in the concepts of coalition and worth of a coalition. This is particularly relevant for multiple causation cases. Indeed, we are able to measure the change in the worth of a coalition when adding or removing a player from that coalition. This is captured by the notion of individual *marginal contribution* of a player to any coalition *S*. Formally, the marginal contribution of player *i* to coalition *S* is defined by

$$Cm_i(S) = v(S) - v(S \setminus i)$$

It is the difference between the worth of coalition *S* and the worth of coalition *S* without player *i* (a difference which is of course equal to zero when *i* is not included in *S*). We will argue that it is accurate, relevant and fruitful to describe some of the most common legal causation concepts used by scholars and found in the *Restatements* (causation, necessity and the but-for-test, sufficiency and the NESS test) in terms of marginal contributions.

[44] For *n* players, there are $2^n - 1$ coalitions. The order of players has not importance, the coalitions {1,2} and {2,1} are the same.

Consider first necessity in the legal sense of the but-for-test. A player *i* is said to be *necessary* to a coalition *S* *if and only if* removing player *i* from *S* leads to decrease its worth from *d* to zero:

$$Cm_i(S) = d$$

From this point of view, the necessity requirement of the but-for-test proceeds by comparing the state of the world that occurred where *i* has tortiously acted with a hypothetical state of the world without *i*'s act, assuming the other tortfeasors have tortiously acted. In formal terms, a player will be said necessary according to the but-for-test *if and only if* he is necessary to the grand coalition *N*:

$$Cm_i(N) = d$$

It should be noticed that the but-for-test does not take account the marginal contributions to sub-coalitions. In the two-fire example, none of the tortfeasors could be said necessary because their contribution to the grand coalition is zero. Remove player 1 (resp. player 2) from the subset {1,2} – i.e. compare the state of the world with player 1 (resp. 2) and the state of the world without player 1 (resp. 2):

$$Cm_1(N) = v(1,2) - v(2) = 0$$
$$Cm_2(N) = v(1,2) - v(1) = 0$$

A torfeasor is said to have been sufficient for the occurrence of the damage *if and only if* his individual marginal contribution is equal to the harm *d*:

$$Cm_i(i) = v(i) = d$$

Such a definition can be extended to coalition. A coalition is sufficient if its worth is equal to *d*. A subset *S* of tortfeasors will be said "*minimally sufficient*" *if and only if* the marginal contributions of all the players in *S* equal *d*. The players are consequently necessary to the sufficiency of this coalition. The concept of minimally sufficient is in line with the NESS test. In the bridge example, {1,2}, {1,3} and {2,3} are minimally sufficient subsets.

3.3 *Characterizing overdetermined causation cases*

The concept of marginal contribution helps in characterizing overdetermined causation cases. They are games (*N*,*v*) where the marginal contribution to the grand coalition is zero for at least one non nul player.[45] Table 2 lists the different cases in terms of marginal contributions.

[45] A player who never contributes is a nul player. His marginal coontributions are all equal to zero.

			A		
			Necessary $Cm_A(N) = d$	**Not Necessary** $Cm_A(N) = 0$	
			Not Sufficiency $Cm_A(\mathrm{A}) = 0$	**Sufficient** $Cm_A(\mathrm{A}) = d$	**Not Sufficient** $Cm_A(\mathrm{A}) = 0$
B	**Necessary** $Cm_B(N) = d$	**Not Sufficient** $Cm_B(B) = 0$	Excluded	Pull/Push car	Pollution
	Not Necessary $Cm_B(N) = 0$	**Sufficient** $Cm_B(N) = d$	Pull/Push car	Two fires	Bridge
		Not Sufficient $Cm_B(B) = 0$	Pollution	Bridge	Paul's car

Table 2. Overdetermined causation case: marginal contributions, necessity and sufficiency

The failure of the but-for-test is better understood. Mathematically, nothing prevents marginal contribution to the grand coalition from being zero for all the players. This is not the same thing as considering that *global* contribution is zero. The main criticism we address to the but-for-test is to be too restrictive: it considers only the contributions to the grand coalition. However, the effective contribution of a player to the final result lies not only on his contribution to the grand coalition but also on his contributions to the intermediate coalitions. In Paul's car example, the marginal contribution of player 1 to the grand coalition is zero precisely because coalition {2,3} has already a positive worth. In other words, it is because player 2 and 3 have already caused together the harm that player 1 gives no additional harm to this coalition. Obviously, what could be said about player 1 is also true for player 2 and 3. An appropriate causation criterion should take account of this property. Regarding this issue, the NESS test is superior: it takes account all the sufficiency sets (including intermediate coalitions). This leaves a room for evaluating the "degree of causation" or the causal influence of an activity on the occurrence of the harm. And the Shapley value is an interesting and useful benchmark for this evaluation.

4. Causation, contribution and the Shapley value

We have shown that the classical concepts of the cooperative game theory are relevant to analyze the law. One step further is to deal with the best apportionment of liability among tortfeasors.

4.1. *Sharing rules and apportionment*

The multiple causation cases lead to a practical difficulty: how to share the damage to be paid to the victim among the tortfeasors involved. In most of the case, the victims have a right to be fully compensated for their loss and the shares of each torfeasors need to be determined. This is the case of several and joint liability[46]. The *Restatement (third)* advocates a two-step process: firstly, apportionment by causation and secondly apportionment by responsibility.[47] However, it is sometimes said that operationalizing that two steps process in overdetermined causation cases is quite complicated. For Michael D. Green, asbestos litigation illustrates the difficulty: "Assessing causal roles in asbestos gets into some of the knottiest causal problems in tort law: Consider two of the most interesting, yet perplexing: First, suppose that for a plaintiff to contract lung cancer, a threshold dose, say 100 units of asbestos exposure is required. Suppose that defendant has been exposed to 105 units of asbestos by 21 defendants, each providing 5 units of exposure. Each one can claim that it was not a but for cause of the harm because absent its asbestos, the plaintiff still would have contracted lung cancer. This is the toxic substances analog of the classic problem of two independently set fires, each of which would have burned down the plaintiff's house at the same time. Courts have, uniformly in the case of two tortfeasors who set the fires, held them both liable, employing the —substantial factor rubric of the Second Restatement."[48]

The example is the same as Paul's car of our typology and has the same structure as the pollution case where each polluters pour 50 units of toxic substances in a lake with a threshold of 100 units. No apportionment on causal basis seems to be implemented, at least when but-for-test is used. This is the consequence of what it is previously said: the but-for-test takes into account only the marginal contribution to the grand coalition. But, another view is possible: assessing the causal contribution taking into account the marginal contributions to all coalitions. This is precisely what the

---

[46] In most cases involving multiple tortfeasors, plaintiffs can sue the defendants jointly or separately and the law allows for contribution among joint tortfeasors (*see* the article from Michael Faure in this issue).

[47] For an analysis of the two step process in terms of the Shapley value applied to successive injuries ("successive liability games") *see* Pierre Dehez and Samuel Ferey, 2016, *art. cit*.

[48] Michael D. Green, *Second Thoughts about Apportionment in Asbestos Litigation*, 37 SOUTHWESTERN U. L. REV 531, 535 (2008). For a similar view, *see* Chris Miller, *art. cit*., 337. *See* note 35. "Does it matter if, instead of 21 defendants, there are two—one who provides 100 units, sufficient by itself to cause the disease, while the second defendant provides five units? The second problem occurs when other defendants provide 105 units and the 22nd defendant contributes but one-tenth or even one-hundredth of a dose, a trivial dose. This gets to the frequency, regularity, and proximity requirement that many states have imposed, which sets a threshold of involvement before a defendant can be found a cause at all."

Shapley value does. In the remainder of the section, we explain why the Shapley value formula can be used to evaluate the causal contribution of each of the tortfeasors implied.

4.2. *The Shapley value: formula and applications*

An injury has been caused by several actors (injurers or tortfeasors). The problem is to specify a division of the resulting damages among the injurers. Our idea is to base the division on "marginal damages". The Shapley value allocates $v(N)$, the worth of the "grand coalition" N (which is also the value of the damage to be paid and shared among tortfeasor), on the basis of players contributions to *all* coalitions, not only on the basis of their contributions to N.

The Shapley value is defined as a weighted average of players' marginal contributions:

$$SV_i(N,v) = \sum_{S \subset N} \frac{(n-s)!\,(s-1)!}{n!}\big(v(S) - v(S \setminus i)\big) \quad i = 1,\ldots,ni \qquad (*)$$

where the weights depend on coalition size.[49]

The Shapley value provides an evaluation of the contribution of each player to the final result taking account of their individual marginal contributions to all the coalitions. As such, it is a formula. However, it is based on desirable properties that an allocation rule should possess.[50] Let's consider a simple case (Paul's car) involving three players:

$$v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = 0$$
$$v(1,2) = v(1,3) = v(2,3) = d$$
$$v(1,2,3) = d$$

This is a symmetric game: all players are equal and the Shapley value allocates an identical amount to each player. This is confirmed by the following table:[51]

	$i = 1$	$i = 2$	$i = 3$	weight
$S = \{2,3\}$	d	0	d	1/6
$S = \{1,2\}$	d	0	d	1/6
$S = \{1,3\}$	d	0	d	1/6

[49] We use lower case letters to indicate subsets' sizes: $n = |N|$, $s = |S|$,...

[50] *See* Pierre Dehez and Samuel Ferey, *art. cit*. for details on axiomatizations of the Shapley value.

[51] Only the coalitions with a non-zero worth are listed.

$S = \{1,2,3\}$	0	0	0	1/3

Applying formula (*), the Shapley value indeed reduces to the equal division allocation: $SV_1 = SV_2 = SV_3 = d/3$. The three players would be exonerated if the but-for-test were applied: their marginal contribution to the grand coalition is indeed zero. The Shapley value provides an alternative apportionment and assesses that all have contributed for one third to the loss eventually suffered by the victim. Each one is present in two subsets that cause the loss. They are in a symmetric situation and the result is quite natural. It could be said that the Shapley value is consistent with the NESS test insofar as the 2-player sets {1,2}, {2,3} and {1,3} are sufficient and each players are necessary elements of these sufficient sets.

Let's consider another the pollution game. The resulting potential damages are given by:

$$v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = v(2,3) = 0$$
$$v(1,2) = v(1,3) = v(1,2,3) = d$$

Here, the marginal contributions are different from the previous case because 1 is a necessary (but no sufficient) element. The following table gives the associated marginal damages.

	$i = 1$	$i = 2$	$i = 3$	weight
$S = \{2,3\}$	0	0	0	1/6
$S = \{1,2\}$	d	d	0	1/6
$S = \{1,3\}$	d	0	d	1/6
$S = \{1,2,3\}$	d	0	0	1/3

Applying formula (*), the Shapley value reduces to the following allocation of damages d:

$$SV_1 = \frac{2}{3}d$$

$$SV_2 = SV_3 = \frac{1}{6}d$$

Injurer 1 supports 2/3 of damages *d* and the remaining third is allocated equally between injurers 2 and 3. They are indeed "equal".[52] The Shapley value recognizes the role played by injurer 2 and 3. They have contributed to the harm insofar as they are necessary element of a sufficient set to bring the harm about. The Shapley value is an interesting sharing rule that takes into account the facts that firstly player 1 is a necessary element (1 is present in the three sets of tortfeasors which bring about the harm) but, secondly, player 1 is not a sufficient element (it is needed that either 2 or 3 joins 1 to bring the harm about). That is why player 1 has not to fully compensate the victim on his own (1 is not a necessary and sufficient cause): 2 and 3 have to pay a share of the damage. Compared with the NESS test, the Shapley value is one of the sharing rules developed in cooperative game theory that seems consistent with the NESS test insofar as the Shapley value takes account of the marginal contribution of players of all the intermediate – and sufficient – sets (subcoalitions) bringing about the harm.

4.3. *Why the Shapley value ?*

Another view on the Shapley value is to study its properties. In cooperative game theory, these properties are called axioms. One of the most famous axiomatization is due to Shapley[53] and states that the Shapley value follows four axioms: the first one is called efficiency; the second one is a nul player axiom; the third one is a symmetric axiom; the fourth one is an additivity axiom. More precisely, it has been proved that the Shapley value is the only allocation rule that verifies these four axioms.

It is interesting enough to wonder whether these axioms (and their mathematical counterparts) have a meaning for the law. The axioms 1 to 3 are quite obvious for the law. The first one states that the worth of the grand coalition is shared among players. It is nothing but the fact that the entire harm is paid to the victim (no less, no more)[54]. The second one is that a nul player (his contributions are zero for all coalitions) has not to pay anything. He is not causal. The third one deals with equal treatment of equals regarding their participation to the harm (two symmetric players pay the same amount). The fourth axiom states that if a game G1 is the sum of two games G2 and G3

---

[52] If instead only the marginal contributions to the grand coalition, $v(N) - v(N \backslash i)$, were taken into account (the but-for-test), we would end up with a division of damages that imposes to the injurer 1 to pay for the entire damage, a division that could hardly be considered as being fair.

[53] Lloyd S. Shapley, *A Value for n-person Games*. in Harold W. Kuhn and Albert William Tucker (eds.), CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF GAMES II (Princeton) (1953), 307-317. There are several axiomatization of the Shapley value, starting with Shapley's original one.

[54] We exclude punitive damages.

(G1=G2+G3), then, the Shapley value calculated for each player and associated to G1 is the sum of the Shapley values associated to G2 and G3. For each player, SV1=SV2+SV3.

This last axiom is more difficult to interpret than the others and we would like to insist on its meaning in the legal context. Indeed, according to us, the additivity axiom is in line with the principles advocated in the Restatement regarding apportion of damage among tortfeasors.[55] The Restatement explicitly insists on the fact that when harms are divisible – i.e. it is possible to divide the harm in several parts[56] – apportionment should consider separately these parts of the harm. Regarding this issue, it could be expected that the best sharing rule be additive i.e. the same apportionment should be implemented by applying the sharing rule to the entire case or by applying the sharing rule separately to the different parts of the harm. It is precisely the result the Shapley value leads to. The additivity property assures that the Shapley value leads to the same result.

Let's imagine that three tortfeasors lighted fires that destroy two houses H1 and H2, all the two are properties of a victim V. But let assume that the factfinders demonstrates that 1/ fires lighted by A and B merged together and destroyed H1 causing an harm for d1; 2/ fires lighted by B and C merged together and destroyed H2 causing an harm for d2; 3/ fire lighted by A would have destroyed H1 alone but not H2 and fire lighted by C would have destroyed H2 alone but not H1. How to consider apportionment in that case? Dividing harms by causation leads to deal with H1 and H2 separately. The two "subcases" are overdetermined cases but A and B are involved in H1 and B and C are involved in H2. Applying an additive sharing rule makes sure that the amount of the compensation to be paid by A, B and C is the same whether the case is globally settled (H1 and H2 together) or the two cases are settled separately. This is a strong argument in favor of the Shapley value as a rule to apportion damages in case of overdetermined cases.

5. Concluding remarks

Causation is one of the most intricate and difficult issues in the law. In the present paper, we provide an economic approach to multiple causation in the law focused on a specific set of cases, the overdetermined causation cases. Three main ideas have been hold in the paper. Firstly, the language and concepts of cooperative game theory – sets, coalition, contribution, solution concepts, sharing rules – are of great interest for legal scholars. They provide a formal approach of most the legal concepts used in the literature such as "sufficiency set", NESS test, contribution, but-for-test. Secondly, this approach highlights the paradox raised by a strict application of the but-for-test. These paradoxes rely on the fact that the but-for-test focuses on the marginal contributions to

[55] See See the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY, (2000) and notably TOPIC 5: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY WHEN DAMAGES CAN BE DIVIDED BY CAUSATION (§ 50).
[56] Mostly, a part of the harm is due only to one tortfeasor or to a subset of tortfeasors.

the great coalition but does not take into account the causal contributions to intermediate coalitions. We have shown that a zero contribution to the grand coalition does not mean that a player has not causally contributed (the share of a tortfeasor determined by the Sapley value may be positive even if his contribution to the grand coalition is zero). There is a bridge between scholars advocating the use of the NESS test and the ones advocating contributive or substantial factor criteria. Thirdly, our approach leaves a room open for considering other sharing rules in order to solve the difficulty of apportionment of damage in case of multiple causation.