Séminaire interne GREDEG - Jacopo Bedogni (GREDEG) / Luigi Marengo (LUISS)
de 14:00 à 15:30
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Jeudi 1er octobre 2015
Jacopo Bedogni (GREDEG)
Do not Spread Information to Too Many People! Market Inefficiencies in a Consumer Network-Based Model?
In the context of market exchange between consumers and producers, a substantial problem of asymmetric information arises when the consumption of experience goods is concerned. In contrast with search goods (furniture, glassware, cameras), consumers cannot assess the quality of an experience good (food, cars, tv) before having purchased it. This type of asymmetric information may lead to market failures. Indeed, as producers’ quality is indistinguishable ex ante by consumers, there might be a high chance they fail to exchange with the best producers. However, two forces may promote consumers’ learning, facilitate informed choices and improve market efficiency: experience and consumer’s social network. On the one hand, the higher the number of purchases, the better consumers’ ability in screening producers. On the other hand, consumers are embedded in a social network through which they interact and share information on producers’ quality. Built on these ideas, we develop an agent-based model that aims at investigating the relationship between experience goods, asymmetric information, consumers’ communication networks and market outcomes. We show that what is crucial for market efficiency is not only how many times the good is experienced but also which type of network structure that conveys information is considered. In particular, the most efficient communication structure (fully connected), which allows information to be global and move instantaneously to every node (reflecting the neoclassical traditional view), produces the least efficient market outcome as a consequence of the aggregate learning dynamics. Indeed, network topologies that preserve local clustering and increase path length are more beneficial for consumers.
Luigi Marengo (LUISS)
The Dynamics of Organizational Structures and Performances under Diverging Distributions of Knowledge and Different Power Structures
Résumé : In this work we analyze the characteristics and dynamics of organizations wherein members diverge in terms of capabilities and visions they hold, and interests which they pursue. In particular we examine how different forms of power can achieve coordination among such diverse capabilities, visions and interests while at the same time ensuring control and allowing mutual learning. By means of a simple simulation model of collective decisions by heterogeneous agents, we will examine three different forms of power, ranging from the power to design the organization, to the power to overrule by veto or fiat the others’ decisions, to the power to shape the very preferences of the members of the organization. We study the efficiency of different balances between the three foregoing mechanisms, within a framework in which indeed organizations ‘aggregate’ and make compatible different pieces of distributed knowledge, but the causation arrow goes also the other way round: organizations shape the characteristics and distribution of knowledge itself, and of the micro ‘visions’ and judgements.
En savoir plus sur l'invité : ici
Télécharger le working paper : ici